Cooperation is understood to mean the participation of more than one person in the same immoral or criminal action.
Varying degrees of association in a situation which is contrary to right order.
Many examples in medical practice: a surgeon who kills an unborn baby is guilty of a serious breach of the moral law. But what about his assistant at the operation, or his anesthetist.
Some principles are helpful in establishing the existence or degree of guilt.
Kinds of Cooperation-Different Kinds of Acts
From the viewpoint of the internal act cooperation is either formal or material depending upon whether one intends the sin whose external commission one is aiding.
From the viewpoint of the external act, cooperation is either positive or negative, according to whether one does something to help the principal agent or does nothing to impede him. Positively it can be moral cooperation, such as voting for an unjust law or cheering on a sinner; or physical as in the case of the one who leaves the door unlocked for the convenience of the thief.
One takes part in the evil action and at the same time adopts the evil intention of his associate.
An anesthetist who adopts the same intention as the surgeon in an operation to perform a contraceptive sterilization formally cooperates in the evil. Formal cooperation in the sinful act of another is always wrong and the cooperator is equally guilty of the act as the principal actor.
Formal Cooperation can be explicit or implicit. It is explicit when the end intended by the cooperator (finis operantis) is the sin of the principal agent. Von joins an anarchistic society because he agrees with its aims and wishes to help in bringing them about.
It is implicit when the cooperator does not directly intend to associate himself with the sin of the principal agent, but the end of the external act (finis operis) which for the sake of some advantage or interest the cooperator does intend, includes from its nature or from circumstances the guilt of the sin of the principal agent. Von joins the anarchistic society not because he likes or agrees with its principles but because he wishes to obtain through membership certain social or financial advantages which he cannot obtain otherwise.
Immediate material cooperation
--occurs when one actually performs the immoral action in cooperation with another.
Smith defines it as the performance of a morally good or indifferent action which is inherently and intimately bound to the performance of an evil action on the part of the principal agent, in such a way that the evil action of the principal agent stands as a defining or morally significant circumstance of the cooperator's action which corrupts its moral species that it is rendered impermissible.
Thus, in the abortion operation, if the surgeon and assistant are actually aborting the fetus, the cooperation of the assistant is said to be immediate material cooperation. IMC will usually be formal cooperation and the cooperator is equally guilty with the principal agent. IMC will usually be formal cooperation because it is senseless to say that a person in his right mind performs a criminal act without intending in his will to do it.
Exception can be had in the case of theft when one is forced at gunpoint to carry the burden. The one forced however is not a thief -- because of the definition of theft since with regard to the person forced into assisting by threat of death, the owner's unwillingness to have his property taken would not be reasonable. As regard to the real thief, it would be.
By the same token such exception would not apply in the case of abortion, because while to remove the property of another to save one's life does make the act cease to be theft, to perform an abortion at gun point does not make the act cease to be abortion.
Mediate material cooperation
Mediate material cooperation involves concurring in the sinful act of another but not in such a way that one actually places the act with the other or concurs in the evil intention of the other but by doing something which is good or indifferent in itself, that action supplies an occasion of sin to another or supplies assistance, means or preparation.
The will of the cooperator is not so much that one cooperate in the sinful act, as that the other person uses the action of the cooperator as occasion or assistance to his crime.
Since the cooperator foresees but does not intend the evil he is faced with a question of the principle of double effect.
Special consideration here is directed toward the proportion between the cooperation and the gravity of the crime.
Points to keep in mind
1. The good effect will be, at least, my own freedom of action, plus the value of me doing this or that action, not wrong in itself. For example, administering an anesthetic is and indifferent action. For a resident in Anesthesiology to administer anesthesia during an abortion, even though under duress, might represent for him the continuation of this particular residency training program.
2. The evil effect will usually have a double aspect. First there is the fact that the action is an occasion for sin or an assistance to it. Then, there is the consideration of harm to a third person as a result.
It is evident that these effects are evil, because they are contrary to the moral order of love
MMC is subdivided into proximate and remote by reason of its nearness according as the act of sin will follow closely or otherwise on the act of cooperation.
Proximate cooperation is morally connected with the evil action of the principal agent, but remote has no such moral connection with the sin.
This nearness is a Moral category. I mean that we are talking about how definite it is that the sin of the agent follows on the act of the cooperator. (Now, we might also think of the question of necessity. Will the principal agent act even without the assistance I provide? On the other hand, what if what I am doing is actually capable of causing the agent to rethink his or her position?)
So if Jason is talking about getting rid of his MA director and all of a sudden asks to borrow your baseball bat and enough rope to go around a man’s neck, to acquiesce would be to cooperate proximately.
However, if Jason asks to use a pair of soft-sounding shoes, the cooperation is indefinite, even if he uses them to sneak upon his unsuspecting professor, since he may simply want to be quiet in the halls.
What if he asks me to teach him an ancient Oriental art form that is capable of being used for lethal maneuvers but is recognized for inherently teaching forgiveness, self-control, and respect for life? What I am capable of teaching him has a some moral probability of bringing about a change of heart. How definite,(proximate) morally speaking, is it that my martial arts instruction will be used for the evil instead of resulting in that conversion?
Divisions according to degree of influence
From the viewpoint of activity
-it is either occasional or effective
occasional is understood as that which leads another into sin or allows him to be drawn into it, such as scandalous example or failure to give fraternal correction. This is easy to see for example when the parishioner says he or she is going to do something immoral and the priest remains silent.
effective is assistance given to another enabling him to carry out or carry out more easily an act of sin. This is the case when the priest, in the last example says go ahead.
From the viewpoint of nearness to the act of the principal agent
cooperation is either immediate or mediate, depending on whether the cooperator shares in the sinful act or in some act that preceded or followed it. If I help the thief carry away the stolen goods, the cooperation is immediate. If I provide him with the key or give him shelter afterwards, it’s mediate.
From the viewpoint of the dependence on it of what is done
Cooperation is either indispensable or not (necessary or free) depending upon whether the principal agent can act without it or not. Claudius supplies intoxicants to Titus and Sempronius who are intemperate. Titus cannot secure intoxicants except from Claudius. Sempronius can secure them elsewhere. Claudius is necessary for Titus but not for Sempronius.
The Sinfulness of Cooperation
Formal cooperation is always sinful since it includes the approval of the sin of another and some willing participation in that sin.
In confession then it would not suffice to say that one cooperated in sin, one must also identify the sin committed.
Material cooperation is analyzed according to the principle of double effect. From the cooperation two results follow, one that is good and one that is bad. Two conditions don’t really have to be dealt with though. (1) The condition that the good effect must not be secured through the evil effect. Why, because if one intends the sin of another as a means to a good end, cooperation is _________ (implicit formal). Can you think of an example? (2) The condition that the evil effect is not intended is also verified, for that would by definition be formal as well. So we can confine our attention to the two remaining conditions.
1. The act of the cooperator must be good or at least indifferent. Of course if it is evil the cooperation becomes implicitly formal.
An act of cooperation can be intrinsically evil if it has no uses except such as are evil. It is intrinsically wrong to assist in the manufacture or distribution of obscene books or pictures, or anything used exclusively for immoral purposes since the only use for them is sinful. The CDF has declared that any policy or plan on the part of a Catholic hospital to cooperate in sterilization is intrinsically evil. (Quaecumque sterilizatio)
An act of cooperation is evil according to its circumstances if it signifies approval of evil, gives scandal , endangers the faith or virtue of the cooperator, or violates a law of the Church. It is not wrong to loan Joe your .357 magnum. It is if you are aware that he intends to eliminate all those who are not engineers from the student body.
2. The second condition is that the cooperator must have a reason sufficiently weighty to justify permitting the evil connected with his cooperation.
The graver the sin the will be committed the graver the reason required. A graver reason is required for cooperation in assualt than for cooperation in theft.
The nearer the cooperation is to the act of sin the greater the reason required. He who sells paper to the publisher of obscenities cooperates remotely; he who set the type or proofs the text cooperates proximately. Thus a greater reason is necessary for the latter than for the former.
The greater the dependence of the evil act on one’s cooperation, th greater the reasons. I would have to have much more serious reason to justify giving intoxicants to a person who abuses liquor if he is unable to secure it elsewhere, than if he can easily get them from others. But unlike the current defense of the President, just because someone else will do it does not constitute a sufficient reason for cooperation.
Reasons for cooperation correspond to the gravity of the goods or evils involved.
A grave reason for cooperation is required when, if one refuses it a great good will be lost or a great evil incurred. A day’s wages is generally a great good. Severe or long period of pain, things that bring on notable shame or repugnance.
A very grave reason for cooperation is the gain or retention of a very great good or the avoidance of a very great evil. A notable percentage of one’s goods in life is considered a very great good. A severe and long illness, unemployment of a breadwinner of a family, serious detriment to one’s honor, etc.
Graver reasons that surpass the very grave without being supreme are loss of one’s station in life, incurable disease, loss of an eye or other principle member, perpetual imprisonment.
Most grave are the public safety, loss of all of one’s property, death, extreme disgrace, etc.